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Game-theoretic analysis is a well-established part of the toolkit of economic
analysis. In crucial respects, however, game theory has failed to deliver on
its original promise of generating sharp predictions of behavior in situations
where neoclassical microeconomics has little to say. Experience has shown
that in most situations, it is possible to tell a game-theoretic story to ￿t
almost any possible outcome. We argue that, in general, any individually
rational outcome of an economic interaction may be supported as the Nash
equilibrium of an appropriately chosen game, and that a wide range of these
outcomes will have an economically reasonable interpretation. We consider
possible attempts to salvage the original objectives of the game-theoretic
research program. In at least some cases, information on institutional struc-
tures and observations of interactions between agents can be used to limit
the set of strategies that may be considered reasonable.
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On the face of it, game theory is in no need of saving. Game-theoretic analy-
sis is a well-established part of the toolkit of economic analysis, with several
Nobel prizes to account for its signi￿cance. Game-theoretic concepts, most
notably Nash equilibrium, are routinely employed in all areas of economics.
Mostly con￿ned to graduate courses as recently as the 1980s, game theory
is now a standard part of the undergraduate curriculum.
In crucial respects, however, game theory has failed to deliver on its orig-
inal promise of generating sharp predictions of behavior in situations where
neoclassical microeconomics has little to say. In particular, it was expected
that game theory could be used to model markets that ￿tted neither of the
polar categories of monopoly and perfect competition, the only kinds for
which standard microeconomics yields a clear solution. The work of pio-
neers such as Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg, reinterpreted in terms of
Nash equilibria, appeared to indicate the direction in which progress could
be made.
These expectations now appear over-optimistic. Experience has shown
that in most situations, it is possible to tell a game-theoretic story to ￿t
almost any possible outcome. Although this point is only occasionally ac-
knowledged in the formal literature, it is much more widely accepted in
informal discussion.
Mandel (2005) says:
Game theory represents an evolutionary dead-end in the de-
velopment of economics. Game theory tries to use the principle
of rationality to explain con￿ict and cooperation in a wide range
of economic and social situations. For example, game theory has
been used to analyze why the apparently insane buildup of nuclear
weapons in the postwar period was actually a rational method of
deterring war, and why aggressive price-cutting by airlines was
an e⁄ective means of deterring competition.
Game theory is no doubt wonderful for telling stories. How-
ever, it ￿unks the main test of any scienti￿c theory: The ability
to make empirically testable predictions. In most real-life situa-
tions, many di⁄erent outcomes ￿from full cooperation to near-
disastrous con￿ict ￿are consistent with the game-theory version
of rationality.
To put it a di⁄erent way: If the world had been blown up
during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, game theorists could
have explained that as an unfortunate outcome ￿but one that was
just as rational as what actually happened. Similarly, an industry
that collapses into run-amok competition, like the airlines, can
be explained rationally by game theorists as easily as one where
1cooperation is the norm.
In this paper, we show that Mandel￿ s assessment is supported by a num-
ber of well-established propositions. The best known of these is the folk the-
orem on in￿nitely-repeated games. However, the Klemperer-Meyer analysis
of oligopoly, showing that any outcome with non-negative pro￿ts for all ￿rms
can be derived as the Nash equilibrium of a game with supply shcedules as
strategies is probably the most important. We argue that this and related
results can be extended to a wide variety of economic interactions commonly
modelled in game theoretic terms, and illustrate this point with a consid-
eration of Tullock contests, which we argue can be represented in terms of
markets for in￿ uence. Hence, it can be shown that equilibria analogous to
Cournot, Bertrand and a continuum of intermediate cases may be supported
for Tullock contests of all kinds, regardless of the success function, which has
been the main focus of analytical attention in the Tullock contests literature.
We show that the same point applies to a large generic class of economic
interactions.
Thus we claim to have shown that, in general, any individually rational
outcome of an economic interaction may be supported as the Nash equi-
librium of an appropriately chosen game, and that a wide range of these
outcomes will have an economically reasonable interpretation. We consider
arguments to the e⁄ect that this is not a serious problem for game theory
as it is currently practiced, and conclude that such arguments cannot be
sustained.
Next, we consider possible attempts to salvage the original objectives
of the game-theoretic research program. We argue that, in at least some
cases, information on institutional structures and observations of interac-
tions between agents can be used to limit the set of strategies that may
be considered reasonable. This empirical evidence may be integrated with
axiomatic characterisation of reasonable choices of the strategy space.
2 Background
In the postwar development of game theory, the crucial turning point was
the discovery of the folk theorem, which, in its various forms, states that
any individually rational outcome of a game may be derived as the Nash
equilibrium of an in￿nitely repeated game. The central idea, to which we will
return, is that any one player can enforce the acceptance of their preferred
equilibrium by adopting a ￿ Grim￿strategy of permanent non-cooperation if
anyone else deviates.
The bitter pill was sweetened by the observation that, in some cases,
￿ unbelievable￿equilibria could be ruled out by the imposition of additional
criteria such as subgame perfectness. This gave rise to a more general re-
search program based on the search for ￿ re￿nements￿of Nash equilibrium
2that would, ideally, generate unique equilibrium predictions for inde￿nitely
repeated games.
By the end of the 1980s, the re￿nements literature had reached a dead
end. As Alexander (2003) observes
Unfortunately, so many re￿nements of the notion of a Nash
equilibrium have been developed that, in many games which have
multiple Nash equilibria, each equilibrium could be justi￿ed by
some re￿nement present in the literature. The problem has thus
shifted from choosing among multiple Nash equilibria to choosing
among the various re￿nements
While the folk theorem implied a signi￿cant narrowing of the theoretical
scope of game theory, it did not directly challenge the validity of the main
economic applications of game theory, most of which related to one-shot
or ￿nitely repeated games. Developments in the theory of oligopoly are
arguably more signi￿cant, though they have attracted less attention.
The crucial result is that of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) who show
that, if arbitrary supply schedules are allowed as strategies, any market
outcome consistent with individual rationality (non-negative pro￿ts) can be
supported as a Nash equilibrium. This result can be illustrated by numerous
choices of strategic representations, at least as plausible as the standard
Cournot and Bertrand representation. For example, Grant and Quiggin
(1996) analyse the cases when the strategic variables are ￿xed or ad valorem
markups. Menezes and Quiggin (to come) analyse the case of revenue as a
strategic variable.
As with the folk theorem, the negative Klemperer￿ Meyer result was ac-
companied by a hopeful positive direction. KM proposed a new equilibrium
concept based on the premise that uncertainty in the demand function could
constrain choices in such a way as to yield a unique equilibrium. This idea
has been applied to British electricity markets (See, for example, Green and
Newbery, 1992, 1996), but has not been adopted more generally.
Menezes and Quiggin (2006) extend the KM argument to economic in-
teractions in general. The central result is that for any individually rational
outcome of an economic interaction, any game-theoretic representation of
that economic interaction can be extended, by the inclusion of additional
strategies, to support the given outcome as a Nash equilibrium.
3 A critique of current practice
The theoretical analysis described in the previous section demonstrates that,
in the absence of additional structure, game theoretic representations of
economic interactions, whether one-shot, ￿nitely repeated or in￿nitely re-
peated, cannot rule out any individually rational outcomes. To understand
3this negative result, and to consider possible ways forward, it may be useful
to consider a more speci￿c critique of current practice.
We begin by considering a general class of economic interactions which
may be represented in game-theoretic terms. We show that representations
of such interactions may take a form which leads to a seemingly natural
speci￿cation of the associated game, but that in fact
We illustrate this point by considering two areas to which game theory
has been applied: duopoly and oligopoly problems in industrial organization
and contests modelled using the approach developed by Tullock.
We show that the two problems are isomorphic in a formal sense and
that this isomorphism has a natural economic interpretation. Nevertheless,
because the standard representations di⁄er, the strategy spaces assumed to
be available to players, and hence the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes, also
di⁄er.
3.1 Economic interactions
Consider an economic interaction involving N agents. The outcome of the
interaction may be derived from an equation of the form
y = f(x1;:::xN)
where xn is a variable (discrete, continuous or mixed) summarising the
action of agent n. Each player￿ s return is given by
un = u(y;xn)
Among the many examples that may be described in this way are oligopoly
problems, Tullock contests and contributions to public goods. More gener-
ally, Hartley and Cornes (2006) de￿ne the category of aggregative games,
all of which admit representations of this kind.
At this point, the standard procedure would be to treat the information
above as the basis for a game-theoretic representation with the strategy
space for player n given by xn, and solve using the Nash equilibrium or some
related equilibrium concept. To pick just one example, the presentation of
the general Tullock problem in the excellent survey by Konrad (2004) takes
exactly this approach.
But there is a crucial gap in the argument. Nothing thus far warrants
the assumption that the strategy space for the given interaction is given by
XN. On the contrary, it is easy to show that the same interaction may be
represented in arbitarily many di⁄erent ways, each of which has an equal
prima facie claim to de￿ne the strategy space.
Consider any strictly monotone transformation zn = z(xn;y). We can
easily show that there is a 1-1 mapping from X to Z and an outcome repre-
4sentation g(z;y) that is identical in form to that given above, and conveys
exactly the same information.
As a means of representing the determination of outcomes, any two rep-
resentations of this kind are equivalent, and the choice between them may
be determined by the preferences and analytical background of the modeler.
For example, economists are used to representing market situations in terms
of supply and demand curves, so the Cournot representation of oligopoly,
with quantity as the ￿rm￿ s action variable, and market price determined by
the demand curve, seems entirely natural.
However, there is no reason to suppose that a representation that is
analytically convenient for economists will be a sensible choice of strategic
variable for a game-theoretic representation. As Grant and Quiggin observe,
for example, quantities and prices vary over time and are in any case not
well-de￿ned when (as is nearly always the case) output is heterogeneous. By
contrast, a ￿rm may, if it chooses, hold markups constant over arbitrarily
long periods. Hence, it may be suggested, markups are a more plausible
choice of strategic variable than either prices or quantities.
3.2 An example: Elections as duopoly games
Consider a two-person standard Tullock contest that can be thought, as it
has often been the case in this literature, as an election. The usual strategic
representation has each of the candidates choosing the total amount to be
spent in the campaign. In this context, if we denote candidate i￿ s choice by





The utility or payo⁄ of player i is is then given by:
Vi = ￿i ￿ ci;
with the normalisation of the ￿ prize￿for winning the election to one. This
strategic representation of the elections game has a unique equilibrium in
pure strategies which is symmetric and where both agents choose




To explore the connection with oligopoly games, we now consider the case
where there is a linear supply of electoral in￿ uence which is given by:
p = q1 + q2;
with the interpretation that p is the price paid by the candidates for each
unit of in￿ uence and qi the in￿ uence gained by candidate i. Accordingly,
ci = pqi;i = 1;2:







Now consider the ￿ Cournot￿strategic representation where the candi-


























Now consider a strategic representation that is equivalent to a ￿ Bertrand￿
model of oligopoly. Under this scenario the candidates compete for voters
in the ￿ prices ￿ space. We impose the standard assumptions in Bertrand
competition, where the voters will vote for the candidate who o⁄ers the
higher price. In the event that both candidates o⁄er the same price, voters
are equally split among the two candidates. It is not di¢ cult to see that the




That is, any price lower than one leads to ￿ undercutting￿ . Under this equlib-









The same approach can be used to derive equilibria in ￿xed and ad val-
orem markups over unit cost, as in Grant and Quiggin. More generally, the
Klemperer-Meyer proof that any individually rational outcome may be sup-
ported as an equilibrium in supply schedules can be adapted to the present
case.
3.3 Asymmetric equilibria
Thus far, we have focused on symmetric equilibria. Observation of, for
example, elections, suggests that asymmetric equilibria are of equal interest
in the analysis of Tullock contests.
6One strong prediction of the standard Tullock contest model is that
there are no Nash equilibria in which only one player contributes, winning
with probability 1. The argument is reasonably straightforward. Consider
a candidate equilibrium in which p1 > 0;pj = 0 for _ j 6= 1: Then player
1 can bene￿t by reducing her contribution. Also, if p1 is small enough,
other players can bene￿t by contributing. More formally, @u1
@p1 = ￿1 at p2 =
p3 = ::: = pn = 0: Similarly, Player 2￿ s best response when p1 > 0 and
p3 = ::: = pn = 0 is such that @u2
@p2 = 1
p1 ￿ 1 > 0 at p2 = 0. Thus, Player
2￿ s best reply to p1 > 0 and p3 = ::: = pn = 0 involves a positive e⁄ort or
contribution.
Indeed, in this game, the unique (symmetric) Nash equilibrium is such
that pi = n￿1
2n = p for i = 1;:::;n: To see this, note that n￿1





(p1+(n￿1)p)2 ￿ 1 = 0.
That is, under a strategy space where players choose a contribution
level pi, the prediction is that all players will make positive and identical
contributions. In reality, though, uncontested elections are common. Indeed,
we show next that it is possible to obtain this as an equilibrium outcome
of asymmetrical games with di⁄erent speci￿cations of the strategy space, in
which the uncontested winner is the ￿rst mover.
We model this assymmetric game by assuming that player 1￿ s strategy
space is given by a probability of winning ￿￿
1,0<￿￿
1 < 1; with the special
interpretation of a minimal contribution ￿1 if all other players choose 0, in
which case player 1 receives the prize with probability 1. For _ j 6= 1; the
strategy spaces consist of contribution levels pj; as before, and again we
avoid continuity problems by requiring that either pj = 0 or pj > ￿j for
some ￿j > 0:
That is, having chosen ￿￿
1; and conditional on the (non-zero) strategies









As an example, consider the case where n = 2; and suppose the contest
involves expenditure on professional pollsters, campaign consultants and so
on. There is a pool of service providers available, and player 1 chooses
to retain the services of some subset of the providers, leaving the rest to
player 2. Player 2 chooses whether to run , and if so, how many days of
campaigning will take place. Player 1 pays for his retained providers for the
length of the campaign, or pays ￿1 if 2 does not run. Then ￿￿
1 is simply the
proportion of the pool of service providers (expressed in terms of cost per
day of campaigning) retained by 1.
More generally, following Baik and Shogren (1992), we can suppose that
Player 1 commits to match some proportion ￿￿
1 of the contributions of the
7other players. In an election context, it is natural to think of Player 1 as
the incumbent. However, much the same analysis could apply to an open
seat in which one candidate is seen by the others as having the capacity to
match as much of their spending as (s)he chooses.
The symmetric Nash equilibrium of the standard Tullock game is also
a Nash equilibrium of the new game. However, there is also an additional
family of Nash equilibria where player 1 makes the minimal contribution ￿
and receives the prize with probability 1.
To check this, note that if player 1 chooses ￿￿
1 consistent with a contri-
bution p1 = n￿1
2n , it is a best reply for players 2;:::;n to contribute p = n￿1
2n :
Similarly, when players 2;:::;n contribute p = n￿1
2n , player 1￿ s best reply
is to choose ￿￿
1 = 1
n, which is consistent with a contribution of p1 = n￿1
2n :
To see that there is an additional family of Nash equilibria where player 1
makes the minimal contribution ￿ and receives the prize with probability 1,
observe that, if ￿1 > 1 ￿ 1
￿j;8j 6= 1; the best-reply strategy for player j
is pj = 0;8j 6= 1: Conversely, given that all pj = 0;8j 6= 1; the choice of
￿1 is weakly optimal, since player 1 pays ￿1 and receives the prize regard-
less of the choice of ￿1: Since player 1 moves ￿rst, this is subgame perfect.
(The family of such equilibria corresponds to values of ￿￿






, but the outcome is the same in each case).
3.4 Generalizations
The example given above can be generalized to Tullock contests of all kinds,
and will typically give rise to natural economic interpretations of variables
analogous to the price and quantity of electoral attention, the Cournot,
Bertrand and markup strategies and so on. Note that the choice of strategic
representations is orthogonal to the variation more commonly considered in
the literature on Tullock contests, the success probability function mapping
a vector of e⁄orts to a vector of success pobabilities.
Thus, any outcome from complete dissipation of rent to the substantial
duopoly pro￿t associated with the quasi-Cournot outcome can be given a
plausible interpretation, and any individually rational outcome can be rep-
resented as a Nash equilibrium in supply schedules. As illustrated above,
this includes asymmetric outcomes
More generally, in any social interaction where economic modelling is
relevant, there must be some analog to a market, with associated prices and
quantities. Just as with Tullock contests, game-theoretic representations
are available yielding equilibrium solutions analogous to Cournot, Bertrand,
￿xed and variable markups and so on.
Finally, the results of Menezes and Quiggin (2006) extend the general folk
theorem resulting to one-shot and ￿nitely repeated economic interactions.
84 Does it matter?
Taken cumulatively, the folk theorem, the Klemperer-Meyer analysis of
oligopoly and the more general analysis of economic interactions presented
here demonstrate that, given a description of an economic interaction and a
feasible outcome consistent with individual rationality, a strategy space can
be chosen for which the given outcome is a Nash equilibrium (under fairly
weak conditions, the unique Nash equilibrium). Any symmetric outcome
for a typical aggregative game can be represented as an Nash equilibrium
for strategies de￿ned by some strategic variable that may be interpreted
as a function of price and quantity, and there is in general, no warrant for
preferring any particular choice of strategic variable.
Nevertheless, it may be argued, current practice does not to change, or
at least does not to change signi￿cantly, in response to this observation. We
￿rst consider methodological defences based on the claim that a require-
ment for speci￿c predictions is inappropriate. Next we consider the claim
that the choice of strategy space is not, in fact, problematic, but is under-
taken appropriately in standard applications of game theory to economic
problemes.
4.1 Methodological defences
One way of viewing this ￿nding is as an explanation of the extraordinary
market success of the game-theoretic program. Whatever the observed out-
come, a game-theoretic explanation is guaranteed to exist, and it is up to
the ingenuity of the theorist to ￿nd the appropriate strategy space and put
forward a plausible ex post rationale. In this sense, the success of game the-
ory is similar to the earlier successes of Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxist
analysis of political and economic phenomena.
The critique of such theories by Popper, who presented falsi￿ability as a
demarcation criterion separating scienti￿c from nonscienti￿c reasoning, and
pointed to Freudianism and Marxism as prime examples of non-falsi￿able
theories has been generally accepted by economists. However, a storytelling
approach has been defended, most notably by McCloskey.
Responding to Mandel (2005) Cowan (2005) suggests the possibility that
The real world is in fact indeterminate or close to indetermi-
nate. The indeterminacy and multiple equilibria of game theory
are not a problem, but rather re￿ect how closely the theory mir-
rors reality. Yes you might prefer sharp, clear predictions, but
tough tiddlywinks, you￿ re not going to get them. Faithfulness to
reality is more important than ful￿lling abstract methodological
strictures.
and says that, if this is true, game theorists could ￿declare victory and
9go home.￿ Cowan further observes that ￿ Like so much of economics, the
strongest argument for game theory is simply to chat with someone who
doesn￿ t know any￿which (in the absence of a claim for predictive power) is
most naturally interpreted in terms of the rhetorical or storytelling approach
favored by McCloskey.
Despite the appeal of the rhetorical approach as a description of much
actual practice, it does not appear satisfactory except to de￿ne a linguistic
community. In the absence of predictive power, it is unclear why game-
theoretic descriptions of, say oligopolistic markets, should be preferred to,
say, Marxist accounts of the same phenomena, or the personality-based
analyses that characterise much of the business press.
4.2 A misrepresentation of current practice?
In the discussion above, it was argued that given an outcome representation
of the form y = f(x1;:::xN) it is inappropriate to assume that the situation
can be modelled as a game in which the strategy space for player n consists
of possible choices of xn: It might be objected that this is not an accurate
representation of game-theoretic practice, and that the choice of strategic
representation is normally based on explicit consideration of substantive eco-
nomic considerations rather than being read o⁄from an essentially arbitrary
choice of representation.
We do not accept this objection, at least as a general description of
current practice.Standard texts on game theory pay little or no attention
to the determination of the strategy space. Rather they typically rely on
examples in which the strategy space is ￿xed by assumption and focus on
the determination of equilibrium outcomes.
Our assessment is supported surveys of particular ￿elds such as Konrad￿ s
excellent summary of the literature on Tullock contests. Although a wide
range of issues is discussed, the choice of strategy space is barely mentioned.
The closest approach is the work of Baik and Shogren, discussed above.
Even in the absence of formal attention to the question, we do not claim
that all applications of game theory follow a purely mechanistic approach.
Skilled practitioners of game theory may well initial representations that give
rise to reasonable representations of the strategic interaction, even if they do
not make this explicit. But this makes economic application of game theory
an art rather than a science. And in the absence of a detailed knowledge
of the problem at hand, it is di¢ cult for a reader to determine whether a
given application is the product of skilled handling of game-theoretic tools
or merely a mechanistic application of textbook techniques (technical skill
in the derivation of equilibrium is likely to be orthogonal to understanding
of the economic situation being modelled).
105 Can game theory be saved ?
5.1 Improved modelling of individual behavior
In a response to Mandel entitled , Cowen (2005) implicitly concedes Mandel￿ s
claim about the current state of game theory and says:
I can think of possible responses:
1. Behavioral approaches will ￿esh out how humans actually
behave. Game theory will end up with clear predictions, just give
it time.
2. Computational approaches will ￿esh out how humans ac-
tually behave. Game theory will end up with clear predictions,
just give it time.
3. Evolutionary approaches will ￿esh out how humans actu-
ally behave. Game theory will end up with clear predictions, just
give it time.
4. Experimental approaches will ￿esh out how humans actu-
ally behave. Game theory will end up with clear predictions, just
give it time.
Any one of these answers would su¢ ce and allow us to push
full steam ahead
These claims can be interpreted in various ways. From the viewpoint of
the literature arising from the folk theorem, and particularly the discussion
of re￿nements the most natural interpretation is that studies of individuals
from the various approaches listed above will make it possible to identify
Nash equilibria in a given game that are consistent with actual human be-
havior and to discard those that are not.
This approach fails to take account of the interpersonal nature of the
interactions dealt with by game theory, and the way in which those interac-
tions are represented by the Nash equilibrium concept. A Nash equilibrium
is an outcome where each player believes themselves to have chosen the best
available strategy, contingent on the assumption that the other player is
pursuing a particular strategy. Given the availability of alternative strategic
representations, what matters is not the players￿subjective representations
of their own strategies but the strategy that each player imputes to the
other.
This point may be illustrated by considering a duopoly interaction in
which each player represents as a game in which the player concerned adopts
a Bertrand (price) strategy, while assuming that the other player adopts a
Cournot (quantity) strategy. Let the market demand be D(p); and let the
inverse demand function be P (Q) Consider the best response price choice for
11player i conditional on the quantity choice for j: The best response function
is given by
p￿
i (qj) = argmax
pi
pi (D(pi) ￿ qj) ￿ Ci (D(pi) ￿ qj)
Observe that
p￿




i (qj) = argmax
qi
qiP (qj + q) ￿ Ci (qi)
5.2 Alternatives to Nash equilibrium
The analysis above has focused on the Nash equilibrium concept, and its
re￿nements. It may be that alternative equilibrium concepts will prove
robust to criticisms of the kind put forward here. Most obviously, the validity
of the maximin solution for zero-sum games is not called into question by
the analysis above. In fact, it is the ability of any player to achieve their own
maximin outcome in any game, zero-sum or otherwise, that bounds the set
of feasible Nash equilibria. However, since most economic interactions are
not zero-sum, the maximin solution concept is only rarely of interest except
as a source of bounds.
Some more promising possibilities may be found in evolutionary game
theory. Perhaps consideration of conditions under which strategies will sur-
vive in a population, given evolution over time, may yield more robust char-
acterisations of the set of equilibria than those considered here.
5.3 Choosing the strategy space
If all individually rational economic outcomes can be modelled as Nash
equilibria for given strategy spaces, the determination of the strategy space
is obviously of central importance.So, it is natural to consider ways in which
economic agents might seek a favorable determination of the strategy space.
One approach explored in the oligopoly literature is that of a two-stage
game, where the choice made in the ￿rst stage constrains the strategies
adopted in the second stage. For example, Kreps and Scheinkman consider
a two stage game with capacity chosen in the ￿rst stage, and Bertrand
competition in the second. They derive Cournot equilibrium as the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium. However, Grant and Quiggin (1996) show that
with Cobb-Douglas technology and the solution concept of Klemperer and
Meyer, any outcome from Cournot to Bertrand can be sustained in this way.
The issue of how to analyse a strategic situation when the rules are not
properly speci￿ed has been also studied by Agastya (2005). He shows for
example that, under some circumstances, the familiar utility theory tools
12can be applied to modeling how individuals make choices among strategic
situations when the rules of play are not precise. This seems to be a promis-
ing avenue to pursue in circumstances where the consequences of various
individuals￿choices or actions are known such as when there is a set of play-
ers, a pie of a given size that players can share if they agree on how to do
it. In such circumstances, although the particular ￿ rules￿of the bargain are
not known, Agastya shows that it might be possible to sensibly de￿ne choice
rules that can be interpreted as the ￿ rules of the game￿ . The di¢ culty of
course is that such approach might be di¢ cult to apply to situations where
the ￿ size of the pie￿changes with di⁄erent individual choices.
A more general question is whether the determination of the strategy
space should be interpreted as the ￿rst stage in a multi-stage game. The
di¢ culty with this approach is that the general results of Menezes and Quig-
gin (2006) showing that any individually rational equilibrium outcome can
be supported as a Nash equilibrium of an extended game are applicable to
two-stage games of this kind, considered in normal form. Hence, it seems
likely that game theoretic reasoning must be supplemented with additional
economic or behavioral information if sharp predictions are to be obtained
about the determination of the strategy space.
5.4 More attention to institutional structure
The analysis above has shown that no useful statements about equilibrium
can be derived simply from a speci￿cation of the outcome space as a Carte-
sian product of summary statistics for the actions of individual agents. This
issue did not arise in early applications of game theory, since analysis was
applied to games such as chess and poker. In these games the rules specifying
the permissible strategies are either written (as in chess and standard ver-
sions of poker), or agreed by custom (as in nonstandard versions of poker).
Leaving aside the possibility of cheating, the epistemic status of the strategy
space is not an issue for games of this kind.
Some economic interactions have similarly well-de￿ned rules. For ex-
ample, a sealed-bid second-price auction in which communication between
bidders is prohibited has a very simple action (or strategy) space, in which
each bidder￿ s set of possible actions consists of the possible values for their
bids.1
In general, it is necessary to bring to bear extrinsic information about the
￿ rules of the game￿if useful predictions about outcomes are to be obtained.
Such information may be either institutional or behavioral. Institutional
information may be related to knowledge about the political and economic
environment (for example, some ￿ actions￿might be ruled out by law or social
1Of course, as with games like poker, individuals may choose to break the rules, incur-
ring the risk of a penalty.
13norms). In particular, if the institutional structure allows agents to achieve
some outcomes unilaterally, for example by withdrawal, individual rational-
ity provides bounds on the set of feasible outcomes, as shown in Proposition
5.
Behavioral information may involve knowledge about the expectations
or decision-making procedures adopted by participants. Perhaps the most
useful contribution along these lines is that of Sutton (1997). Sutton argues
that empirical evidence on the relationship between the size of the market
and the ￿ toughness￿ of competition may be used to bound the range of
feasible outcomes.
6 Concluding comments
A research program can maintain a ￿ ourishing appearance long after its
initial hope to provide not merely the capacity to explain the world but
to predict and therefore potentially change it has dissipated. Nevertheless,
without predictive power a scienti￿c research program must eventually de-
generate. Game theory in economics is in danger of meeting this fate.
There are, however, some promising options. With more attention to
the determination of the strategy space, incorporating a mixture of institu-
tional analysis and choice theory, the range of outcomes consistent with a
reasonable Nash equilibrium may be limited to an extent that allows useful
predictions.
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